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AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERM
"WILLFUL" IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
STATUTES
I. Introduction
The term "willful" in federal criminal statutes has defied any consistent
interpretation by the courts, while legislatures have similarly neglected to clearly
define its meaning. The term's prevalence in federal criminal statutes and reg-
ulations has raised significant problems for prosecutors and defense attorneys
who must prove the presence or absence of "willful" conduct, as well as for
potential defendants who have no clear barometer on whether their conduct is
prohibited.' The ramifications of determining the meaning of willful vary with
the character of the statute considered; but clearly, the failure to find willfulness,
where it is required, is grounds for dismissal.2 Under some statutes, a
willful violation may be a criminal offense while a nonwillful violation may
incur only a civil penalty.' Moreover, in some cases, the presence of "willful"
intent may raise the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.'
The judicial response to the varying uses of willful in federal statutes has
been chaotic. Different definitions apply to different offenses, and there is little
consensus as to what constitutes a finding of willfulness. Instructions to the jury
regarding proof of a "willful" violation vary greatly, some standing in stark
contradiction to one another.' The interpretations already applied to the term
indicate that some approaches are more appropriate than others in terms of
their fairness and logical consistency.
No effort will be made here to definitively analyze all that has been said
with regard to the interpretation of "willful" in federal criminal statutes;6 most
attempts at an encompassing definition have been confusing at best.' Still it is
possible to accomplish at least two objectives. The first aim is to categorize the
varying interpretations that "willful" has received, in order to delineate some
points of reference for concerned practitioners. Having reported on those de-
velopments, it is instructive to analyze and critique the reasoning behind the
varying categories.
"Willful" has received four fairly broad but interrelated interpretations.
The first and strictest of these interpretations indicates that an act is "willful" if
done with a "bad purpose" or "evil motive." The bad purpose to deliberately
1 See, e.g., Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
2 Marteney v. United States, 218 F.2d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1958).
3 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, §§ 145 (a) and (b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1703.
4 See United States v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, 434 F.2d 1116, 1127 (8th Cir.
1970), cf. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
5 E.g., United States v. Martilla, 434 F.2d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 1969).
6 See 45 WoRDs AND PHRAsEs Willful; Willfully 274-372 (1970), in which approxi-
mately 100 pages are devoted to the citation of cases dealing with "willful" and "willfully."
7 As Justice Frankfurter said in referring to the state of the law covering another issue:
"The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our reports. To attempt
to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before
nor guide the future." Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
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violate the law is sufficient to satisfy the requirement.' The second, less strict,
interpretation considers conduct to be "willful" if it is done with an intent to
commit the act and with a knowledge that the act is in violation of the law. It
does not demand, however, that the defendant subjectively possess the sinister
motivation or bad purpose that is characteristically present in the first category.9
The third interpretation requires only that the act be committed voluntarily
and intentionally as opposed to one that is committed through inadvertence,
accident, or ordinary negligence. As long as there is an intent to commit the
act, there can be a finding of willfulness even though the actor was consciously
attempting to comply with the law and was acting with the good faith belief that
the action was lawful. In effect, it requires an objective intent to commit the
act but not necessarily a knowledge that the act will bring about the illegal
result.Y Finally, some courts have found an act to be "willful" even though it
only involves some form of inadvertence, oversight, or negligence." Under
this last interpretation, a judge can find an act to be "willful" even though it
was not committed intentionally. It is the broadest of the interpretations, and
it is applied most often in judging acts of a corporation which has allegedly
violated a regulatory statute.
The broader interpretations seem to be an outgrowth of the traditional treat-
ment of "willful" under the civil law of torts. This is especially true of the ten-
dency to allow less than intentional conduct to satisfy the requirement of "will-
ful." Yet there are some problems with that development. Prosser categorizes
"willful" as synonymous with "wanton and reckless" conduct. Under this con-
ceptualization a willful act is somewhere between negligent and intentional con-
duct. 2 That conceptualization of the meaning of "willful" is distinctly different
from the interpretation it has historically received in the criminal law." The
guideline instructions for the criminal law in Federal Jury Practice and Instruc-
8 It is akin to the requirement of specific intent. Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952).
9 United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
10 United States v. Williams, 421 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1970); cf. Ellis v. United States,
206 U.S. 246 (1906) (Holmes, J.).
11 Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1964).
12 See W. PROSsER, THE LAW or TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971). For example, a driver
might inadvertently take his eyes off the road to look at the passing scenery and as a result
strike and kill a pedestrian crossing the street in front of his automobile. Under traditional
tort law concepts, his conduct would be considered negligent. However, if the driver was
drunk and driving far in excess of the speed limit on an icy evening, in addition to inadvertently
letting his attention drift from the road, his conduct under such circumstances according to
Prosser could aptly be described as willful, wanton, and reckless. Finally, compare the case
in which the driver, with his mind about him, knowingly and deliberately hits the crossing
pedestrian; this of course would be an intentional tort. So it is possible, then, to see how
"willful" can indicate conduct that is more blameworthy than negligence but less so than
intentional conduct. However one can easily see how, although the driver might have been
drunk and exceeding the speed, limit, it is entirely likely that he had no intent to strike the
pedestrian. It is even more improbable that he voluntarily and with specific intent or with a
bad purpose intended to strike the pedestrian. Nevertheless, under the civil conceptualization,
it was permissible to find him "willful" because of the application of a different and less
demanding standard. Yet, if one were to substitute the criminal concept of willful one could
not find the reckless driver's conduct to be intentionally committed with the bad purpose to
strike and kill the pedestrain. Therefore one could not come to the conclusion that such
conduct was committed "willfully."
13 Compare Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438 (1894), and Evans v. United States,
153 U.S. 584. (1893), with Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1970).
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tion treat "willful" in the following manner: "An act is done 'willfully' if it is
done voluntarily and intentionally ... with the bad purpose to disobey or disre-
gard the law."' 4 This approach suggests that specific intent with bad purpose or
evil motive is essential to a finding of willfulness.
This distinction between the meaning of willful under the criminal and
the civil law has become blurred in the last few decades, and has resulted in
judges expanding the interpretation of "willful" in the criminal law to the point
indicated above, i.e., encompassing almost every possible form of conduct without
any consistent interpretation emerging. These broader interpretations involve a
cutting back on the more strict standard, described in Federal Jury Practice and
Instruction," that was traditionally applied in criminal prosecutions. The
adoption of these less demanding standards has been of more recent origin, and
the frequency with which a court will define "willful" in these broader terms
today depends to a large extent on the offense charged. The more regulatory
or administrative the statute appears the more likely a court will resort to a less
strict standard. This is in contrast to the tendency to impose a stricter require-
ment when a statute proscribes a more traditional common law offense.
It is important to analyze these developments in the interpretation of
"willful" through both historical and conceptual frameworks to determine
the extent of the conflict and confusion that rages over the term's meaning.
Clearly, "willful" in the early stages of interpretation was defined strictly. For
a variety of reasons some interpretations have departed from this strict standard;
the objective here is to discern whether these departures are proper in terms of
their reasoning and their results. The expansion of the meaning of "willful" has
evolved by a snowballing process that has gradually rendered the term useless
as a tool for describing or prohibiting any particular conduct. The reasoning
of the cases in this process is often faulty and the judicial branch is rendering a
large number of federal criminal statutes onerous in their potential scope by
failing to give the language of the statutes any consistent interpretation. Hope-
fully, this examination will contribute to an understanding of the dimensions
of the problem and a recognition that the word is overused in statutory con-
struction and too little understood or consistently treated by the judiciary.
II. Early Interpretations Requiring "Willful" to Include a Bad Purpose
A. The Strict Interpretation Is Established
Early interpretations of "willful" in federal criminal statutes indicated that
it means an act committed not only voluntarily but also with a bad purpose.
"It is frequently understood," says Bishop, "as signifying an evil intent without
justifiable excuse."' 6 The tendency in the early stages of interpretation was to
require a deliberate intention to evade or disregard the provisions of the law as
14 1 E. DEvITT & . BLACxmAn, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 16.13
(2d ed. 1970).
15 Id.
16 1 J. BIsHop, CRwrNAL LAw § 428 (1923).
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a prerequisite to the imposition of punishment.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Felton v. United States,"
a regulatory case. Defendant was charged under an Act of 1868 imposing taxes
on distilled spirits.18 Section 16 provided that certain regulations were to be
followed in the distilling process, and § 96 provided that if any distiller should
"knowingly and willfully omit, neglect, or refuse to comport with the guide-
lines,""9 he would suffer a penalty of $1,000 and forfeit to the United States
government any remaining interests that he had in spirits. The defendants in
Felton had inadvertently failed to furnish a wine cistern of the prescribed
capacity. They requested a good faith instruction and it was denied. The jury
returned a guilty verdict together with a finding that there was only a technical
violation of the law and that there was clearly no intention to defraud the gov-
ernment or evade the provisions of the law. The Supreme Court reversed on
appeal. In discussing the question of whether the voluntary conduct of the
defendants was willful, the Supreme Court said that the technical violation of the
statute was not sufficient since there was an absence of the bad purpose which
would render the neglect "willful" and therefore actionable. "Doing or omitting
to do a thing knowingly and willfully implies not only a knowledge of the thing
but a determination with bad intent to do it or omit doing it."2 The Felton case
established the widely followed principle that the gravamen of any offense which
requires a showing of willfulness is the bad purpose with which the act is com-
mitted.2'
St. Louis & S.F.R.R. Co. v. United States22 expanded this concept: mere
failure, even if the failure was intentional, to perform the duty prescribed by a
regulatory statute would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of willfulness.
judge Van Devanter considered an action against the defendants to recover a
penalty for alleged failure to comply with an Act of 1906 which prohibited the
confinement of cattle in a railroad car without unloading for rest, water, or food
beyond the statutory limit of 28 hours.2 ' The judge emphasized the distinction
between a simple failure to perform the duties created by the statute and a
"willful" failure to perform those duties. judge Van Devanter considered it
improper to ignore the qualifying word "willful" because it described an
essential element of the offense; that element required that the attitude of a
carrier having a free will reflect an obstinate disregard or plain indifference to
the requirements of the law. A voluntary and intentional act without this added
purposefulness would not be sufficient to meet the test of willfulness. 24
17 Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1878).
18 The Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125.
19 96 U.S. at 699.
20 Id. at 702.
21 See, e.g., note 13 supra.
22 169 F. 69 (8th Cir. 1909).
23 Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3594, 34 Stat. 607.
24 169 F. at 71-73.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
B. The Murdock Dicta: Seeds of Expansion
In 1933, the Supreme Court in Murdock v. United States25 continued to
apply a strict standard of interpretation to the term willful, but in the process
the Court indulged itself in some wide-ranging dicta that went beyond the scope
of the immediate case. This dicta26 considered willful in very loose terms, imply-
ing that it was a word of many acceptable meanings and interpretations. That
implication was seized upon by later courts to introduce broader interpretations
of the type of conduct that could constitute "willfulness" under the criminal law.
Murdock was one of the original sources of the erosion of the distinction that
long existed between "willful" as a civil law tort term, and "willful" as a specific
element of intent in the criminal law.
In Murdock, the defendant was charged with willfully refusing to testify
and supply information concerning deductions in his income tax returns under
26 U.S.C. §§ 1265 and 2146(b); and §§ 256 and 1114(b) of the Revenue Act
of 1926.2 The issue was whether or not the defendant's intentional refusal to
answer was necessarily a "willful" refusal. The lower court found that the
defendant's reticence was clearly a voluntary and an intentional refusal substanti-
ating his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, refusing to agree that willful meant no more than voluntary and in-
tentional. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to have the jury
consider the question of an absence of evil motive in his refusal to answer ques-
tions. "The respondent's refusal to answer was intentional and without legal
justification, but the jury might nevertheless find that it was not prompted by
bad faith or evil intent which the statute makes an essential element of the
offense."2
Murdock, then, was entirely consistent with the prior decisions in that it had
upheld the strict interpretation of "willful." But in the course of its opinion, the
Court stated: "The word often denotes an act which is intentional, knowing, or
voluntary as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute
it generally means an act done with bad purpose."29 Some courts have inter-
preted this language as suggesting that "willful" is equivalent to intentional,
voluntary, or knowing. These cases refused to recognize that Murdock in defining
willful was attempting to establish that any act which was willful must at least
have been committed intentionally and never only accidentally or inadvertently.
The Court also clearly indicated that simply because an act was committed
intentionally does not dictate that it was committed willfully; an analysis
confirmed by the Court's specific approval of the Felton case. It indicated that
a definition of "willful" had to include something beyond intent, i.e., a bad pur-
pose or evil motive aspect."0 Moreover, this approach was adhered to in the
25 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
26 Id. at 394.
27 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 23, 44 Stat. 723 (amended by INT. RaV. CoDE oF 1954 §§
7201-7212).
28 290 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1933).
29 Id. at 394.
30 Id. at 395-96.
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early stage of interpretation even when analyzing an administrative or regulatory
statute.31 Murdock, however, added another dimension to these early decisions
even though in agreement with them both in reasoning and result. Murdock
became the source of a broader and less rigorous interpretation of "willful. 32
III. Illinois Central: A Civil Case Uses Murdock to Expand the
Definition of Willful
A. The Case
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R.
Co." Plaintiff brought an action to recover a civil penalty from a railroad
company for its knowing and willful failure to unload cattle which were con-
fined during transit in railroad cars for 37 hours,"' thus exceeding the statutory
limitation of 28 hours. The railroad, however, had obtained an eight-hour
extension and therefore was only one hour over the limit. When the company
had learned that the car would arrive in the stockyards very near the deadline,
it arranged for an extra engine and crew to handle the shipment immediately
upon arrival. 5 The yardmaster, however, negligently failed to notify the other
employees of the arrival of the cattle, causing the cattle to remain unlawfully
confined beyond the time allowed. The district court found for the railroad,
indicating that although the regulations were not complied with in every respect,
the defendant had not "willfully" failed to comply with the requirements of the
act. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed on appeal.
Illinois Central, while a civil action, had a significant impact on the inter-
pretation of willful in federal criminal statutes. It was the first case to depart
from the traditionally strict interpretation applied in earlier Supreme Court
decisions. The decision went further than any other case toward establishing
willful as a word of many meanings depending upon its context. It became a
ready source of precedent for an ever expanding and increasingly ambiguous
definition of willful. It has been suggested that these expansive definitions make
the use of the word meaningless and can easily lead to vague and overbroad
statutes.3" The case, however, is questionable in several respects, and it is at least
arguable that the court misinterpreted the existing precedent in order to sustain
its broad interpretation of willful.
B. Criticism
I. Improper Reliance on Murdock's Dicta
Illinois Central relied on Murdock for its assertion that "willful" means
"an intentional, knowing, or voluntary as opposed to an accidental, inadvertent,
31 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
32 See, e.g., Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963).
33 303 U.S. 239 (1939).
34 Id. at 240.
35 Id. at 241.
36 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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or negligent act."'" However, the Illinois Central court failed to consider the
context of that quote. The Murdock court was merely listing various ways in
which "willful" has been defined in different areas of the law attempting to
determine the proper meaning of willful in federal criminal statutes. Murdock
made no conclusion as to the propriety of the various definitions, and it failed to
distinguish between those definitions. Nor did Murdock indicate the extent to
which it was referring to "willful" as it is used under the civil law of tort as an
alternative description of wanton or reckless conduct. Murdock suggested that
a "willful" act had to be at least intentional, knowing, and voluntary. However,
the Court did not say that if an act is committed intentionally, voluntarily, or
knowingly that it must also have been committed willfully. The statement
merely indicates that an act which only rises to the level of inadvertent, acci-
dental, or negligent conduct is without question not a willful act. In fact, the
Court went on to hold that willful when used in criminal statutes generally means
an act "prompted by bad faith.""8 A willful act, then, according to Murdock,
must not only be an intentional, knowing, and voluntary act, it must also be an
act done with some evil motive or bad purpose aspect.
Notwithstanding this, Justice Butler in Illinois Central ignored the context
of the statement and seized upon those dicta to hold that willful meant inten-
tional, knowing, and voluntary. Illinois Central further suggested that the
language in Murdock made the definition of willful unclear, ignoring the ultimate
determination of Murdock.
2. Improper Application of the Dicta
Even if the dicta in Murdock receive Justice Butler's interpretation, it is
still not support for the result reached in Illinois Central; on the contrary, it
dictates an opposite finding. As argued above, the Murdock Court, through
those dicta, 9 established that an act could not satisfy the requirement of willful-
ness if it had been only negligently as opposed to intentionally committed. Even
if it is assumed that the excerpt from Murdock equates an intentional act with a
willful act, it clearly opposed allowing a negligent act to satisfy the requirement
of willful.4" The act which was found to be willful in Illinois Central was actually
a negligent act, i.e., the negligent failure of the yardmaster, an Illinois Central
employee, to notify the crew to unload the cattle before the statutory time limit
expired.
3. Reliance on St. Louis
Justice Butler also relied on St. Louis & S.F.R.R. Co. to support his decision.
In describing the conduct necessary for a finding of. willfulness, Justice Butler
quoted the following language from St. Louis: "[it is... ] the attitude of a car-
37 303 U.S. at 242-43.
38 290 U.S. at 398.
39 See note 26 supra.
40 See note 37 supra.
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tier who having a free will or choice either intentionally disregards the statute or
is plainly indifferent to its requirements.... ."" The quote was a correct repre-
sentation of the definition applied in St. Louis, however, when this standard was
applied to the facts of the Illinois Central case, an opposite result should have
been reached.
The facts in the St. Louis case are remarkably similar to those of Illinois
Central. Both defendants were prosecuted under the same statute for a civil
penalty. 2 Both defendants had confined cattle that they were transporting in
railroad cars beyond the statutory limit. Both defendants had failed to meet
the deadline by a few hours because of unforeseen time delays. In Illinois Central,
the cattle were confined only one hour beyond the limit. Although the time of
confinement was not indicated in St. Louis, it is unlikely that it was shorter than
one hour. In St. Louis, though, the Court had refused to find that the defendant
had a choice to avoid committing the proscribed act and therefore although it
had failed to unload the cattle within the period it had not done so willfully."
The St. Louis court said that the defendant manifested a disposition to respect
the statute as nearly as it could rather than to disregard or be indifferent to it."
The defendants in both cases had taken positive action in attempting to
insure compliance with the statute. The Court in St. Louis stipulated that such
attempts were made,45 and in the Illinois Central case the defendant after
learning of the unexpected delays dispatched an extra crew to insure unloading
in time. Again, but for the unforeseen negligence in the yardmaster, compliance
would have been insured. It is clear that Illinois Central did not evidence con-
scious disregard or indifference to the requirements of the statute, as the standard
enunciated in the St. Louis case demands. And it is certainly clear that the St.
Louis Court applying its own standards would not have found willfulness based
on the facts of Illinois Central.
4. A Questionable Application of Respondeat Superior
An additional inconsistency exists in the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. It is well settled that the negligence of the employee will be
imputed to the employer if the wrong was committed within the scope of the
employee's work. It is also clear that a corporation can be guilty of a knowing
and willful violation of a regulatory statute through the doctrine of respondeat
superior."' However, it is one thing to say that the knowledge of the employees
and agents of a corporation who commit intentional acts is attributable to the
corporation, but it is quite another to argue that the negligence of those em-
ployees and agents can constitute willfulness on the part of that corporation.
This conclusion is untenable unless one admits that a negligent act by itself can
41 303 U.S. at 243.
42 The actions were brought under 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1970).
43 169 F. at 73.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 71-73.
46 There has been a vast amount written on this subject. See, e.g., Seavey, Speculation as to
"Respondeat Superior," HIAvAim LEGAL EssAYs 433 (R. Pound ed. 1934); Douglas, Vicari-
ous Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE. L.J. 584, 720 (1929).
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be a willful act, which would of course be contrary to the very language of the
Illinois Central case itself. Nevertheless, the Court allowed a negligent act by the
yardmaster to support a finding of "willful."
C. The Significance of Illinois Central
Illinois Central, then, is a crucial point in the expansion of the interpreta-
tion of "willful." After Illinois Central, it is possible to find "willfulness" on the
basis of an intentional and even negligent act-a considerable departure from
prior case law and traditional interpretation.
IV. Extending the Broader Interpretation into the Criminal Area
In the years since the Illinois Central decision, a division has developed in
the federal courts over the interpretation of "willful" in federal criminal statutes.
The split has been between an extension of the broader interpretation and an
adherence to the stricter position taken in the earlier common law cases. Each of
the lower federal court cases allowing a broader interpretation has relied on many
false premises and misinterpretations of prior case law. Initially, it is important
to note that although Illinois Central is a civil case, it has been relied on and
followed in many criminal cases. While the decision is itself deficient, its per-
suasiveness as precedent in the criminal area is even more tenuous.
A. The Process of Extension
Although the reasoning in the cases that have applied the broader interpre-
tation is at least questionable, they have caused a snowballing effect. Later
decisions built upon the misinterpretations of prior cases without thoroughly
examining their reasoning.47 Today, courts often avoid making an extensive
examination of the meaning of "willful." Instead, they summarily cite a case
that supports their position and then terminate discussion. This superficial treat-
ment has made it possible for the improper reasoning of the Illinois Central case
and its progeny in the criminal area to gain a foothold without a clear examina-
tion of their basis.
B. Spies Dicta Aid the Expansion
Five years after Illinois Central,. the Supreme Court again considered the
term "willful" in a federal criminal statute in Spies v. United States."" The
defendant had been convicted of attempting to defeat and evade income tax
in violation of § 145(b) of the Revenue Act of 1936-a felony, and for failure
to make a return or pay tax under § 145 (a)-a misdemeanor.4 9 Both offenses
47 See, e.g., United States v. Maciel, 469 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Couming, 445 F.2d 555 (Ist Cir. 1971); and United States v. Williams, 421 F.2d 600 '(10th
Cir. 1970).
48 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
49 Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648, 1703 (1936) (now INT. REv. CoDm oF 1954 §§
7201-7207).
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required that the conduct be "willful," and the petitioner claimed that the
requirement of "willfulness" had not been met by the government. The govern-
ment, in turn, contended that the knowing and intentional default in the pay-
ment of tax was, of itself, sufficient proof of "willfulness." The Supreme Court
rejected the government's position arguing that "willful" "included some element
of evil motive and want of justification in view of all the financial circumstances
of the taxpayer."50 Spies clearly adhered to the stricter interpretation of "will-
ful" that was developed in the early cases of St. Louis, Felton, Evans, and
Murdock. It once again established that "willful" when used in federal criminal
statutes demanded conduct that was not only intentional, voluntary, and know-
ing, but also conduct that was done with some evil motive or bad purpose to
violate the law or be indifferent to it. However, many lower court cases5 have
relied on the dicta of Spies as support for an expansion of the traditional interpre-
tation; a development similar to the misplaced reliance on Murdock dicta. The
Spies Court stated that "... willful is a word of many meanings depending upon
its context."52 This is very similar to the statement in Murdock discussed above
in that it recognizes that "willful" has become a term of extreme flexibility.
Notwithstanding this use of the term in other areas, the Spies case unequivocally
indicated that when it is used in federal criminal statutes the presence of the word
indicates the requirement of "evil motive."5 "
C. The First Example of the Expansion: Zimberg v. United States
Several courts of appeals decisions have occurred since the Spies decision
that have dealt with the word "willful" in a variety of federal criminal statutes.
Most of these decisions have combined the dicta in Murdock and Spies with the
holding of Illinois Central to apply a broader interpretation of "willful."'"
Infrequently, other courts have refused to do so."
The first of the decisions to follow this pattern of extending the broader
interpretation of "willful" into the criminal area was Zimberg v. United States."
The defendants were convicted of willful violation of price control legislation.5
On appeal they contended that "willful" meant malevolently rather than
merely knowingly and deliberately as the court below had held. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this contention holding that although "willful" does have the
meaning suggested by the defendants in some cases it did not have such a mean-
50 317 U.S. at 498.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
915 (1972); United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 904 (1970); United States v. Fahey, 411 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 957 (1969); United States v. Schipani, 362 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966); and Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963). See also, Janko
v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960).
52 317 U.S. at 497.
53 Id. at 498.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970); and United States v.
Cirillo, 251 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1957). See note 50 supra. See also note 63 infra.
55 E.g., United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970); and Bloch v. United
States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955).
56 142 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1944).
57 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 ch. 26, 56 Stat. 28.
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ing in the present case." Zimberg cited Spies for the proposition that "willful"
is a word of many meanings "depending upon the context in which it is used."59
The court then relied on the holding in Illinois Central quoting directly from
that case: ". . in statutes denouncing offenses involving moral turpitude
'willful' is generally used to mean with evil purpose, criminal intent or the like.
But in those denouncing acts not in themselves wrong the word is often used
without any such implication."6 The Zimberg court insisted that this statute
was generally administrative and therefore fell into the category of statutes "de-
nouncing acts not in themselves wrong."'"
The reasoning of the Zimberg case is suspect for two reasons. First, it
adopted all the false premises of Illinois Central. Second, it ignored the fact that
Illinois Central was an action to recover a civil penalty while Zimberg involved
a criminal sanction. Illinois Central in relying on Murdock had quoted the
clause in Murdock which indicated that "willful" when used in criminal statutes
generally means with a bad purpose-the very principle established as early as
1878.62 However, Illinois Central did not dispute or discuss the meaning of
"willful" under criminal statutes; it simply avoided the issue presumably on the
grounds that it was a civil action. It would seem, however, that the Zimberg
court in dealing with a criminal statute would have felt compelled to discuss the
language of Murdock and other cases which had established the stricter inter-
pretation. Zimberg effectively disregarded the body of law represented by Felton,
St. Louis, and Murdock in a manner that was tantamount to directly over-
ruling them. Zimberg was making new law contrary to existing law without
valid precedent to support this departure, and without successfully distinguishing
the prior case law.
D. The Progeny of Zimberg
Other circuits quickly followed Zimberg in extending the doctrine of Illi-
nois Central into the criminal area,6 and the broader interpretation of "willful"
became increasingly accepted. Each of these cases defined "willful" broadly, re-
fusing to include the bad purpose concept. The first case decided cited only
Zimberg for support.64 Each case thereafter cited all the circuits that had to
date followed Zimberg. The snowballing process extended into the district
courts.6" The net effect is that a large body of law has been ignored without
having been confronted, distinguished, or even recognized. As a practical reality
58 142 F.2d at 137.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 137-38.
61 Id. at 138.
62 See note 17 supra.
63 E.g., United States v. Fidanian, 465 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1972); Steere Tank Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1964); Riss & Company v. United States, 262
F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958); Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.
1951); Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1951); Kempe v. United
States, 151 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1945).
64 151 F.2d at 688.
65 E.g., United States v. Jannuzzio, 184 F. Supp. 460 (D. Del. 1960); United States v.
E. Brooke Matlack, 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957).
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the courts have been maintaining a position without examining its premises or
effectively dealing with competing arguments.
V. The Propriety of Maintaining a Strict Interpretation
A. Implementing Legislative Purpose
In general, cases adopting a broader interpretation have based their
decisions on the policy considerations advanced by the Illinois Central case,
applying those considerations to the criminal area. These courts argue that a
stricter interpretation would render the statute nugatory thereby frustrating
legislative intent. Many of these courts admit that "willful" does have a bad
purpose aspect to its meaning when it is used in statutes that condemn acts
involving moral turpitude.6 6 They maintain, however, that it possesses no
similar meaning when used in statutes denouncing or prohibiting acts that are
not in themselves wrong, i.e., statutes that are essentially administrative or
regulatory in nature. 7 These courts generally note that when a safety act is
involved, such a strict definition would frustrate the purpose of the statute mak-
ing it "virtually impossible" to establish violations.6" The language used to
describe this distinction may vary slightly among courts, but it essentially repre-
sents the same theory. Some courts have spoken in terms of distinguishing com-
mon law offenses from new statutory requirements,69 others have based the
difference on malum in se versus malum prohibitum criteria.0
These courts also maintain that the implementation of the "humanitarian
provisions of the statute"7 1 is a justification for departing from the traditional
definition."2 They argue that the purpose of the statute would be frustrated, and
its overall effectiveness hampered, if in every case the government had to prove
"willfulness" as it was understood in the early decisions. They contend Congress
did not intend that such a strict interpretation be given "willful"; a contention,
however, that both assumes an understanding of legislative intent where none
is expressed, and actually implements an intent that runs contrary to the plain
meaning of the statutory language. In effect these courts are ignoring "willful"
as surplusage.
Morisette v. United States,73 however, represents the opposing principle
that when Congress adopts legal terminology such as willful in a statute, it does
so for a purpose, and thereby adopts the related body of law and interpretation
given the term. In the absence of contrary expression, it must be assumed that
the legislature is satisfied with the traditional position of the courts concerning
66 E.g., 142 F.2d at 132.
67 190 F.2d at 480. See also United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th
Cir. 1975).
68 United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 504 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1974).
69 For a good discussion of this distinction see Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250, 252, 264 (1952); Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955).
70 262 F.2d at 249.
71 303 U.S. at 242.
72 Id. at 244.
73 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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particular language and intends such a judicial approach to be continued.74
Applying this policy to the interpretation of "willful" in federal criminal statutes
dictates that "willful" be interpreted to require intentional conduct plus a bad
purpose.
B. Criticism of the Murdock Dicta
Courts" rejecting this trend toward a broader interpretation have empha-
sized flaws in cases seeking to allow several forms of conduct to satisfy the re-
quirement of "willfulness." Forster v. United States,"6 for example, in reversing
a conviction, rejected a multidefinitional interpretation of "willful" in favor of
establishing a requirement of bad purpose. The court dealt with the broader
interpretation cases and their reading and application of Murdock as follows:
"Apparently on the theory that the Supreme Court said it and.., that is it...
the instruction has been repeated time and again . .. but if one examines the
disputed language, 7 Mr. Justice Roberts was compiling a list of various defini-
tions and no more."7 " Forster further indicated that the compendium of defini-
tions in Murdock was "harmless" 9 and then suggested that the list was not very
helpful in clarifying the meaning of "willful." It then questioned the line of cases
that cited the language of Murdock to support a flexible interpretation of
"willful" in federal criminal statutes when Murdock itself had clearly required
a bad purpose concept.
C. Inconsistency and Unpredictability of the Broad Interpretation
The lack of consensus concerning the interpretation of "willful" also
presents significant problems of inconsistency and unpredictability which are
traditional hallmarks of our legal system."0 Today a federal court has wide
discretion in defining "willful." There is precedent to support both a strict and
broad interpretation. This exceptional flexibility destroys the law's ability to
fulfill its responsibility to give adequate notice of what constitutes offensive
conduct.8 " The situation as it stands now allows a judge to choose from available
definitions of "willful" one that is consistent with his preconceived notions about
the guilt or innocence of the defendants. He is then in a position to justify that
definition by arguing that "willful is a word of many meanings depending upon
its context."8 "
Typically, it is not appropriate to place a power to decide or define criminal
conduct in the hands of the judiciary. This ability to define "willful" as broadly
as the court sees fit runs contrary to the long-standing common law principle
74 Id. at 250.
75 E.g., United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
76 237 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1956).
77 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
78 237 F.2d at 621.
79 Id.
80 See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
81 Id. at 142-66.
82 317 U.S. at 497.
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that penal statutes are to be strictly 3 interpreted; a theory holding that the
power to, define crime and assess punishment is vested in the legislature and not
in the judiciary."4 The argument is that if Congress wishes to define new forms
of conduct as criminal it should do so expressly, and it is not within the province
of the judiciary to punish this conduct without a clear mandate from Congress.
This policy of interpretation, as Chief Justice Marshall said, ...... is perhaps not
much older than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness bf the law
for the rights of individuals."8 " Yet the courts here, by giving "willful" such an
expansive and open-ended reading, are actually legislating ad hoc offenses.
Similarly, the criminal law has always sought to exonerate those who did
not possess a vicious will at the time that they committed the act." Actus Non
Facit Reum, Nisi Mens Sit Reum, or as in Blackstone's translation: "An un-
warrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all.""7 By requiring a
vicious will together with the specific use of the word "willful" in light of its
plain meaning 8 and its traditional interpretation, Congress intended to assess a
penalty only if there was some additional blameworthiness in addition to negli-
gent or intentional conduct. It is certainly within the power of Congress to
establish liability for offenses without requiring "willful" conduct. It is an un-
fortunate distortion to allow the term "willful" to become so malleable that it
conveys no real meaning. Such obscurity surrounding a word's meaning and
therefore the content of a criminal law is not a commendable feature of any
criminal justice system."" When Congress required a violation to be willful it
seems to require more than a finding that a certain act was committed intention-
ally, or deliberately, or knowingly, or negligently, or accidentally, or inad-
vertently. It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature, although it used the
term "willful," actually meant something else."0
VI. United States v. Bishop Indicates That the Broader Interpretation
is Unacceptable
The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that "willful" whenever and
wherever it is used in federal criminal statutes must include a bad purpose or
evil motive aspect in accord with the traditional interpretation. However, in
each individual case that has come before the Supreme Court involving an inter-
pretation of "willful" in federal criminal statutes, the Court has held that in the
instant case "willful" does require a bad purpose element." Nevertheless, as
has been demonstrated, a substantial number of courts of appeals and district
courts have ignored this fact and applied on an individual basis the broader
83 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958) (Douglas' dissent).
84 Id. at 127.
85 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 35 (1820).
86 342 U.S. at 252.
87 As quoted in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRImINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS, at 214
(1969).
88 AMERICAN HERITAOE DICTIONARY 1466 (W. Morris ed. 1969) defines "willful" as "un-
reasoningly obstinate."
89 See generaly 0. HOLMES, TnE COMMON LAw, Ch. 2 (1923).
90 United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958).
91 Potter, Felton, Murdock ard Spies are all good examples of this contention.
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interpretation, denying the existence of any bad purpose requirement. As in-
dicated, these courts rely on a number of factors to support their departures.
One of these factors is that the Supreme Court has proceeded on a case-by-case,
statute-by-statute analysis and has never absolutely held that "willful" is to be
defined in every case with a bad purpose or evil motive element. This limited ap-
proach by the Supreme Court, although consistent with the judicial function to
decide only the dispute before it,92 has allowed lower courts to couple the ra-
tionale of Illinois Central with the broad dicta of other Supreme Court cases
in the criminal area, like Murdock, in making the argument for the broader
interpretation.
Yet in this case-by-case process the Supreme Court has emphasized the
need to maintain a consistency by applying the traditional interpretation until
Congress indicates otherwise. The last time that the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with this question was in 1973, in United States v. Bishop.93 Prior to the
decision in Bishop, the circuits were split over the meaning of "willful" in fed-
eral tax statutes that imposed criminal sanctions. One line of cases best ex-
emplified by Abdul v. United States94 held that "willful" had a double meaning
under federal tax statutes.95 Abdul indicated that the use of "willful" in felony
statutes required a finding of bad purpose in accord with the traditional inter-
pretation; it insisted, however, that where the impending penalty was a mis-
demeanor, a lesser finding of "willfulness" could satisfy the requirement of the
statute.96 The Abdul court cited Spies to indicate the flexibility of the term
"willful"9 and then argued that "willful" could be defined in terms of careless
disregard of the statute.9
United States v. Vitiello99 represents the line of cases contrary to Abdul.
Vitiello rejected an instruction that proof of "willfulness" could be satisfied if it
was shown that there was "careless disregard of whether one had a right to
act."'99 Stating that carelessness was insufficient to satisfy the statute, the court
disapproved of Abdul, indicating that it had drawn an improper conclusion
from a dictum in Spies.' It rejected the contention that "willful" as used in a
misdemeanor tax statute means something less than it does when used in a
felony tax statute." 2
Bishop settled this dispute between the Abdul and the Vitiello positions by
directly disapproving of the double standard of interpretation represented by
Abdul.' The decision pointed out that the Spies Court had indulged in a great
deal of speculation that did not reflect the reality of the law. Bishop emphasized
that Spies had argued only that Congress could have theoretically included a
92 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 85 (1803).
93 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
94 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958).
95 Id. at 294.
96 Id. at 293.
97 Id. at 294.
98 Id.
99 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
100 Id. at 241-42.
101 Id. at 243.
102 Id.
103 412 U.S. at 353-56.
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lesser requirement of "willfulness" in misdemeanor violations but that it had
not. 04 Bishop held that until Congress legislates otherwise, the courts should
continue to adhere to the traditional requirement in tax statutes, i.e., that
"willful" must include a bad purpose element regardless of whether the offense
is a misdemeanor or a felony. The Court also rejected the contention that tax
laws were administrative rather than punitive and as such would demand a
broader interpretation0 5 of "willful" to achieve the desired goal of the statute.
There are three important aspects of the Bishop case that warrant attention.
First, in settling the dispute over the meaning of "willful" in federal tax statutes
the Court held that "willful" has a uniform meaning that is in accord with the
traditional interpretation. It rejected outright the idea. that careless or negligent
conduct could satisfy the requirement of "willful.", Second, the Court once again
indicated its attitude toward the use of the word in all federal criminal statutes,
expressing a strong reluctance to depart from traditional interpretations until
Congress acts. The opinion reflected unfavorably on the judicial branch sub-
stituting its intent for the intent of the legislature. Finally, the Court refused to
accept the invitation to hold that "willful" could mean something different when
it is used in a regulatory statute.
Given the positions expressed in Bishop, it seems that lower courts would be
well advised not to depart from the traditional interpretation. However, it is un-
likely that lower federal courts will feel bound by the Bishop case in any area
beyond the tax statutes. This suspicion has already been confirmed in United
States v. Dye Construction Co.' Dye involved a willful violation of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act in the construction of a building.0 7 Although
the case was decided after Bishop, it took no cognizance of the language in
Bishop and took the position that "willful" is a word of many meanings, apply-
ing a broad and less strict standard. Dye's refusal to recognize Bishop, is pre-
sumably based on the theory that the holding of Bishop was limited to the tax
statute in question. Dye argued that the object of OSHA"' was one of regula-
tion and prevention, and therefore Congress could not have intended that
"willful" demand too difficult a level of proof. The court did this despite the
language of Bishop which indicated that courts should not substitute a reading
of legislative intent that contradicts traditional judicial interpretation unless
Congress has explicitly indicated a change in attitude. Dye cited the usual cases
in support: Illinois Central, Murdock, and Spies. It never discussed the pos-
sibility of requiring a bad purpose.
VII. Conclusion
It is probably safe to assert that the type of offense charged still tends to
dictate how the court will define the term "willful." If the statute deals with a
crime involving turpitude then "willful" will generally be defined to mean with
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975).
107 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-66(e).
108 OSHA is an acronym for Occupational Safety and Health Act.
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a "bad purpose" or "evil motive." A regulatory offense, despite a strong early
tradition to the contrary, will probably yield a definition that is no more than
an intentional or voluntary standard, and may be broad enough to include
negligent conduct." 9
One of the basic tenets of the law is to treat like conduct in a like manner."'
Yet the lack of a definition here leads to inconsistent results, unpredictable
standards, and a general lack of adequate notice to the defendant as to what
types of conduct will be held to be "willful." There ought to be some effort to
deal consistently with the body of law surrounding the use of "willful." There is
a clear need for a definition which adequately explains "willful" and serves to
distinguish it from "intentional," "knowing," "voluntary," "inadvertent," "ac-
cidental," or "negligent" conduct.
The Supreme Court cases decided in this area indicate that the interpreta-
tion of willful should include the requirement of a bad purpose to violate the
statute. The word itself suggests that there ought to be at least a finding of some
specific mental attitude that represents a conscious disregard of the statute or
blatant indifference to its requirements."' The cases which refuse to apply
such a standard argue that their departures from the strict interpretations are
consistent with congressional inten' 1 and are necessary for the effective opera-
tion of the statute. The argument is that the application of too strict a standard
in regulatory statutes would make it "virtually impossible""' to establish viola-
tions. If this is true, and there is considerable merit to that contention, then the
legislature should either make their intent clearer or reconsider the presence of
the word in certain statutes with an eye toward being more selective and con-
sistent in its use. Lacking that, lower federal courts should apply restraint, as
exemplified by the Supreme Court, when interpreting the term "willful."
Stephen J. Brogan
109 See note 68 supra.
110 See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951).
Ill See note 17 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 66-74.
113 504 F.2d at 1335.
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